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The Implications of the Schrems Decision and ending of the US-EU Safe 
Harbour Agreement 
Introduction 
This article looks at the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) decision in 
Schrems v Data Protestation Commissioner1 that was delivered 6th October 2015. This case 
centres on the transfer of personal data from the EU and its Member States to the US under 
the Safe Harbour Agreements. This agreement was introduced to enable a freer flow of 
personal data for trade and industry purposes. However following the revelations of the US’ 
National Security Agency’s use of bulk data collection that included accessing the personal 
data of EU citizens, an Austrian citizen brought his case before the CJEU claiming the NSA 
would have probably accessed his data held by the social media company Facebook. This 
article examines what legal factors led to the CJEU making the decision that has resulted in 
the ending of the Safe harbour Agreement and why it is important that third countries who the 
EU has agreements have in place adequate legal provisions regarding data protection 
The Safe Harbour Agreement 
To protect EU citizens’ personal data the EU-US Safe Harbour agreement was signed in 
2000 under Decision 2000/520/EC in order to provide a streamlined process for US 
companies to comply with the EU’s Data Protection Directive.2 Among the privacy principles 
in the agreement it states that organisations must take reasonable precautions to protect 
personal information from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and 
destruction.3 If US organisations flout EU privacy law the EU Commission can reverse the 
                                                          
1 [2015] EUECJ C-362/14 
2 Actually termed  the European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC 
3 Annex I, paragraph 12 Dec 2000/520, Export.gov, US-EU Safe Harbor Overview at 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp [accessed 23rd September 2015] 
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decision to grant the Safe Harbour arrangement.4 The agreement was mainly aimed at the 
private sector’s access to personal data for business purposes, but in November 2013 the 
European Commission expressed concerns over the large scale access by US Intelligence 
agencies to data transferred by Safe-Harbour certified companies.5 This concern came from 
the disclosure and revelations by former employee of the US intelligence agency, National 
Security Agency (NSA), Edward Snowden that the NSA was involved in bulk data 
collection.6 This led to the European Commission stressing the importance of the national 
security exception in the Safe-Harbour Decision should only be used when it is, ‘…strictly 
necessary or proportionate’.7  
How Schrems ended the Safe Harbour Agreement 
Maximillian Schrems, an Austrian citizen, used the social media network, Facebook, 
since 2008. Although his contract was registered within the EU at the time of his registration 
with Facebook Ireland, this is a subsidiary of Facebook Incorporated which is established in 
the US, where Facebook Ireland users’ personal data is then transferred to the US. Schrems 
contended that the law and practice in the US did not ensure sufficient protection of his 
personal data and in referring to the Snowden revelations of NSA practices, he claimed his 
personal data could have been subject to retention by the NSA and other US federal 
agencies.8 Perceiving Schrems’ complaint as unsustainable in law and bound to fail because 
he saw it as vexatious, the Irish Data Protection Commissioner did not see himself as being 
required to investigate the complaint as there was no evidence that Schrems’ personal data 
                                                          
4Art 3(4) Dec 2000/520European Commission, How will ‘safe harbor’ arrangement for personal data transfer to 
the US work? (09/10/2012) at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/thridcountries/adequacy-
faq1_en.htm [accessed 23rd September 2015] 
5 European Commission, Communication on the Functioning of the Safe-Harbour from the Perspectives of EU 
Citizens and Companies Established in the US, COM(2013)847 Final, p.18 
6 G. Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the US Surveillance State (2014 New York: 
Metropolitan Books) p.92 
7 Dec 2000/520, p.19 
8 Ibid, paragraphs [26] – [30] 
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had been accessed by the NSA.9 In Schrems’ judicial review of the Irish Commissioner’s 
decision,10 the Irish High Court held once personal data has been transferred to the US it is 
capable of being accessed by the NSA and other US federal agencies in the course of 
indiscriminate surveillance and interception of communications.11 Justice Hogan said if this 
matter was to be measured solely by Irish law and Irish constitutional standards a serious 
issue would arise which the Commissioner would have been required to investigate whether 
US law and practice in relation to privacy, interception and surveillance matched those 
standards.12 Acknowledging the Snowden revelations had exposed ‘gaping holes’ in 
contemporary US data protection practice,13 Justice Hogan did not see Schrems complaints as 
‘frivolous or vexatious’14and refereed it to the CJEU. 
In the Opinion of the Advocate General, Advocate General Bot held that as intervention 
of independent supervisory authorities is at the heart of the EU’s system of personal data 
protection, there must be a similar system of protection in the third country to which the data 
flows from the EU.15 In this case under the US’ surveillance Act, Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act 1978, the NSA accessed personal data inputted in Austria that was held by 
Facebook at a server in the US, Advocate General Bot held that the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court does not offer an effective judicial remedy to EU citizens whose personal 
data has been transferred to the US.16 He proposed that when the case went to the CJEU it 
should answer the question if the agreement is invalid.17 The CJEU did answer this question 
                                                          
9 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner Case C-362/14 (Advocate General Opinion - delivered 
23rd September 2015), paragraph [30] 
10 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310 
11 Ibid, paragraph [14] 
12 Ibid, paragraph [79] 
13 Ibid, paragraph[69] 
14 Ibid, paragraph [74] 
15 n 9, paragraph [210] 
16 Ibid, at [210] and [211] 
17 Ibid, at [237] 
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and declared the 2000/520 Decision as invalid18 and consequently brought to an end the Safe 
Harbour Agreement. Crucial to the Court reaching this decision were the requirements of 
article 25 of the 95/46 Directive on data protection. Where communications data is 
transferred from outside the EU to a third country, the EU is responsible for ensuring the 
third country has an adequate level of data protection. In doing so, consideration is given to 
the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the processing operation of the data, the 
country of origin and final country of destination, the law in operation related to data 
protection in the third country and the professional rules and security measures deployed 
regarding the data in the third country.19  
The most pertinent part of article 25 related to the issue in Schrems is it being the 
Commission’s responsibility to find that the third country ensures an adequate level of 
protection of basic freedoms and rights of individuals.20 Should the Commission find the 
third country does not provide an adequate level of protection, Member States are to take 
measures to prevent the transfer of data to the third country.21 Crucial to determining this is 
what is meant by the term ‘adequate’. The third country is not required to ensure there is a 
level of data protection identical to that guaranteed in EU law,22 Advocate General Bot said 
that the protection implemented by the third country may differ from EU law, but it must 
provide adequate protection that is equivalent to that afforded by the 95/46 Directive.23 
Adopting the linguistic viewpoint of the word ‘adequate’ which means satisfactory or 
sufficient, Advocate General Bot said the obligation of the Commission is to ensure the third 
country has a sufficiently high level of protection of fundamental rights.24 The obligation to 
                                                          
18 n 1, paragraph [107] 
19 art 25(2) Directive 95/46/EC 
20 Ibid, art 25(6) 
21 Ibid, art 25(4) 
22 n 1, paragraph [73] 
23 n 9, paragraph [141] 
24 Ibid, paragraph [142] 
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ensure the adequacy of data protection is not a one-off obligation made at the time of 
agreement. The obligation for the third country is an ongoing obligation to ensure that no 
changes in circumstances arise that can call into question the initial assessment25 and it is 
expected the Commission will regularly review the third country’s level of protection.26 It 
was on this legal point that Schrems was successful as the CJEU found the 2000 Decision did 
not cover the situation to limit interference by US state bodies authorised under legitimate 
objectives, such as national security, in US law to interfere with personal data transferred 
from the EU.27 The Court added that legislation permitting public authorities access to the 
content of electronic communications on a generalised basis must be regarded as 
compromising the essence of the fundamental right to privacy under the CFRF.28 This echoes 
the CJEU’s decision in Digital Rights29 where an authority for a state agency to access 
communications data must be specific with a legitimate aim along with sufficient safeguards 
protecting potential abuse by a state agency’s use of that data. On the latter point, in Schrems 
the CJEU found there to be no effective remedy for an individual ensure the data was used in 
compliance with legal provisions similar to those found in the EU.30 
The main surprise from cases like Schrems is not in finding that the Safe Harbour 
Agreement was ruled as invalid it is that this Agreement lasted for fifteen years. Supporting 
this point, there is no single authority dedicated to overseeing data protection law in the US, 
as Sotto and Simpson observe, the US legislative framework designed to protect personal 
data resembles a ‘patchwork quilt’.31 As the US favours commercial enterprises, personal 
                                                          
25 Ibid, paragraph [147] 
26 Ibid, paragraph [137], n6, paragraph [76] 
27 n 1, paragraph [88] 
28 Ibid, paragraph [94] 
29 [2014]EUECJ C-293/12, [2014] 3 WLR 1607 
30 Ibid, paragraph [95] 
31 L.J. Sotto, and A.P. Simpson, ‘United States’ in R.P. Jay (editor), Data Protection & Privacy in 26 jurisdictions 
worldwide 2014, (London: Law Business Research, 2014), 191, p.191 
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data is largely regulated by trade associations.32 Although the US’ Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) oversees the provisions of the agreement regarding consumer privacy issues, including 
the collection and use of personal information, with an authority to do so under section 5 FTC 
Act33 it is only in relation to unfair acts or practices affecting commerce. The Safe Harbour 
Agreement only required US companies to develop their own self-regulatory privacy policies 
to conform with the EU’s data protection principles to qualify them for Safe Harbour34 rather 
than adherence to a federal law providing greater safeguards. The problem with self-
certification is it lends personal data open to potential abuse. These are the gaping holes 
Justice Hogan referred to when Schrems was at the Irish High Court. Potential abuse was 
found by the EU in their first two reviews of Safe Harbour that raised significant concerns. 
The 2002 review found a substantial number of organisations that signed up to self-certified 
adherence were not observing the expected degree of transparency regarding the contents of 
their privacy policies and in the 2004 review it was found that less than half of the 
organisations signed up to the Agreement reflected observance of all seven Safe Harbour 
principles.35 As this Agreement was set up to facilitate a freer movement of data in relation to 
international trade could explain why some of these points were overlooked. While there is 
an argument for self-regulation due its lower burden on business and trade,36 the weakness of 
Safe Harbour is that EU citizens’ personal data was transferred to a jurisdiction with fewer 
privacy protections leaving that data vulnerable to access and abuse by US federal agencies 
like the NSA. Following the Snowden revelations the US and the EU have been negotiating 
an update to Safe Harbour since 2013 with the EU looking to limit the circumstances US 
                                                          
32 A. Muir and C. Oppenheim ‘National Information Policy developments worldwide IV: copyright, freedom of 
Information and data protection’ (2002) Journal of Information Science (28) 467, 478 
33 Annex V Dec2000/520  
34 Ibid Annex I, paragraph 3 
35 C. Connelly, ‘The US Safe Harbor – Fact or Fiction?’(Galexia Pty Ltd 2008), at paragraph 2 
36 D.Haynes, ‘End of Safe Harbour isn’t the end of the world – let’s hope its successor is better’, The 
Conversation 12th October 2015, at http://theconversation.com/end-of-safe-harbour-isnt-the-end-of-the-
world-lets-hope-its-successor-is-better-48841 [accessed13th October 2015]  
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federal agencies could access the transferred data. Even though the US was set to agreeing to 
this, US politicians may retaliate against the Schrems decision by refusing to grant the 
privilege.37 However, transnational business and trade needs may overcome politicians’ 
petulance and a new Safe Harbour Agreement will be signed in the near future containing 
greater legal safeguards regarding data protection that is more truly equivalent those 
contained with the 95/46 Directive.  
It may come as a surprise that the US has no legislation that deeply embeds data 
protection within its legal system. Other western states that have agreements with the EU 
appear to apply similar legal principles in relation to data protection. For example the US’ 
northern neighbour, Canada has the Privacy Act 1985 as well as Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act 2000, the latter being concerned solely with the use 
of electronically stored personal data. Both Acts are clear that personal information cannot be 
used unless it meets strict criteria38 similar to the provisions in the 95/46 Directive and both 
Acts also have sufficient safeguards where individuals can make complaints to the Privacy 
Commissioner39 and the Canadian courts.40 Likewise the Australia’s Privacy Act 1988 
contains similar provisions as the Canadian legislation with section 7 promoting the privacy 
of an individual’s personal data with the safeguards including complaints to the Australian 
Privacy Commissioner41 or to an Australian Court.42 As both Canada and Australia have 
agreements with the EU regarding the processing and transfer of passenger name record data 
held by air carriers43 the two respective states’ legislation clearly offers a level of protection 
                                                          
37 L. Kelion, ‘Facebook data transfers threatened by Safe Harbour ruling’ BBC News 6th October 2015, at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-34442618 [accessed 6th October 2015] 
38 s.7 Privacy Act (1985 (Canada), s.4 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 2000 
(Canada) 
39 Ibid, s.29, s.11 
40 Ibid, s.34, s.46 
41s. 34 Privacy Act 1988 (Australia) 
42 Ibid, s.46 
43 Agreement (Canada) L 82/15, Agreement Australia L 186/4 
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equivalent to that afforded by the 95/46 Directive. The decisions in Digital Rights and 
Schrems demonstrates how EU law views the importance in protecting personal data and why 
it is best placed as an international actor to encourage those third countries it has agreements 
with to adopt similar measure in relation to data protection.  
Conclusion 
 The CJEU’s decision in Schrems that ended the Safe-Harbour agreement between the 
EU-US was a courageous move by the Court on two counts. Firstly the CJEU knew the 
implications of ending the Agreement would have in relation to business and financial 
institutions effectiveness to operate on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The second being 
through the CJEU, the EU was not deterred in aggravating one of the most politically and 
economically powerful states, the US as the Schrems decision is a strong slap in the face of  
US data protection law, or should I say its lack of data protection law. Schrems is not the EU 
seeking revenge on the US following the revelations of the NSA’s abuse in the collection and 
use of communications data related to EU citizens, this decision was made to ensure future 
agreements operate under the rule of law reassuring citizens the activities of intelligence and 
policing agencies operate on a sound legal footing. As we now live in the age of transnational 
companies and financial institutions having operating centres and district headquarters in 
various states throughout the world, the transfer of personal data is one of the crucial 
components in oiling the wheels of industry.  It is vital that any third county where personal 
data is transferred from an EU Member State has adequate legal protection and safeguards in 
relation to personal data, especially where it can be accessed by that third country’s state 
agencies. There will be a successor to the EU-US Safe Harbour agreements, but one where 
personal data will have a greater degree of protection because the message Schrems gives out 
is if you wish to do business with the EU and its Member States you have to make sure you 
take data protection seriously.  
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